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Abstract – Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC), held between 18 and 24 October, 2017, was translated into nine foreign 
languages, including English, with ‘professional foreign translators’ introduced and 
covered in some Chinese media reports. Yet, the focus of such media coverage was more 
on the translators’ endorsement of Xi’s thoughts and achievements than on the quality of 
the translations (e.g. Huang, Liu and Hao 2017). Arguably, the introduction of the foreign 
expert in English could be described as an unusual move since China has hailed its ‘China 
English’ as a new English variety and has it used widely in the translation of the CPC 
political texts. This study starts with the introduction of China English, presents the China 
English usage in the official English version of Xi’s report, and reveals the endorsement 
role of the foreign language experts through a multimodal analysis of the relevant media 
coverage, which not only uncovers the CPC’s ideology in using China English but also 
shows how the ‘visibility’ of translators may help achieve the political aim of those in 
power. 
 
Keywords: the CPC 19th National Congress; China English; ideology in translation; 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (hereinafter the 
19th CPC National Congress), held between 18 and 24 October 2017, has 
seen the Chinese President Xi Jinping reaching the peak of his power and 
reputation, with the ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era’ written in the CPC’s history and Xi hailed as 
the most powerful and capable leader since Mao Zedong (Campbell 2017). 
To better communicate Xi’s thoughts, foreign language experts were invited 
to help translate Xi’s report to the 19th CPC National Congress into nine 
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foreign languages, namely English, French, Russian, Japanese, German, 
Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, and Lao (Huang, Liu, and Hao 2017). The 
participation of these foreign language experts was described as “a historic 
breakthrough” (Ye 2017), with the English version of the report highly 
acclaimed as “powerful” (Chen 2019, p. 5). Arguably, the introduction of the 
foreign English expert was an unusual move since the Chinese government 
has made ‘China English’ used politically in a top-down manner (Jin 2002, p. 
72) and hailed it as a new English variety with Chinese characteristics that 
can better communicate China’s image and elements to the world, help China 
resist Anglo-American cultural hegemony, and further win China the power 
of discourse against a backdrop of English used as the world’s lingua franca 
(Chang 2017). 
To investigate whether the use of the foreign language experts might be 
meant to boost the status and acceptability of China English, this chapter will 
first introduce the features and nature of China English. Next, I will review 
and analyse the official English version of Xi’s report to the 19th CPC 
National Congress to see whether this highly-acclaimed version, the success 
of which has been claimed to be partly (if not largely) attributed to English 
language expert Holly Snape, contains China English translations. This will 
be followed by a multimodal analysis of China’s official media coverage of 
the foreign language experts involved in the translations of Xi’s report, with a 
special focus on the English language expert. By examining the image and 
role of these foreign translators hired by the Chinese government, the results 
of the study shall facilitate a clear understanding of the use of China English 
in China’s external propaganda and provide insights into how the ‘visibility’ 
of translators may help achieve the political aim of those in power. 
 
 
2. The development and purposes of China English 
 
The concept of China English was first proposed by Ge Chuangui in 1980 (Ge 
1980) and then elaborated by Li (1993, p. 80) into “[a language] mainly used 
as an international language in China, with Chinese borrowings, nativised 
lexicology as well as unique syntax and discourse structure as its major 
features, [which] contributes much to the international communication”. In 
brief, China English is different from Chinese English; the former is deemed as 
English with Chinese social and cultural characteristics, while the latter is 
similar to pidgin English or known as Chinglish (Jiao 2009). In detailing the 
difference between Chinglish and China English, Jin (2003) points out that 
Chinglish is a result of negative influence of the user’s mother language 
(Chinese), is unstable, involves constant self-correction, and varies with 
individuals, while China English is relatively more stable, has rules to follow, 
and is learned and shared on a collective basis. Furthermore, Chinglish may be 
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used to express anything that is inside or outside China, while China English is 
meant to introduce and communicate the cultures and things with Chinese 
characteristics (Tu 2006, p. 84). 
Since the 1980s, there has been a growing trend towards recognition of 
China English (e.g. Wu 2008). Although a few Chinese researchers are 
worried that China English, which is deviant from standard English, may 
hinder intercultural communication (Qiu, Ning 2002), it is widely maintained 
that the use of China English can enhance China’s international status, 
promote Chinese culture to the world, strengthen Chinese national identity 
and solidarity, contribute to expansion of English vocabulary, and suit 
China’s social reality (e.g. Jiao 2009; Luo 2010). Consequently, Chinese 
translators and interpreters are urged to deal with Chinese-English translation 
by using China English, which, as Chinese translation researchers argue, 
retains complete cultural meanings and characteristics of Chinese words (Jin 
2001, p. 16; Bao 2008; Luo 2010, pp. 54-6), increases China’s cultural status 
and influence on the international stage (Lin 1999), demonstrates the 
confidence of Chinese translators/interpreters in their domestic culture (Bao 
2008, p. 322), and makes translation from Mandarin Chinese into English 
easier (Luo 2008, p. 97). 
 
2.1. China English translation strategy and ideological 
implications 
 
China English translation is largely based on the ‘foreignising’ strategy or 
tendency, which leads to such commonly adopted translation approaches as 
transliteration, literal translation, or transliteration/ literal translation with 
explanation. Yet, there are no definite rules for creating China English usage 
at either lexical or syntactic level (Chang 2017, pp. 419-20). Some Chinese 
academics point out that transliteration of Chinese words and phrases, or zero 
translation, may be used deliberately to keep the meaning of the translation 
ambiguous when translators or interpreters are not authorised to interpret 
terms produced by Chinese leaders, such as the case of bu zheteng (meaning 
do not get sidetracked) in a press conference of Chinese former president Hu 
Jintao in 2008 (Zhu, Zhang 2011, p. 68). Zhu and Zhang make it clear that 
remarks or speeches of Chinese leaders are “authoritative discourse in the 
same category as sacred texts,” and, therefore, translating such texts becomes 
a political act that cannot be performed without the consent of the authority 
(Zhu, Zhang 2011, p. 71). This explicitly indicates that the ideology of the 
authority matters most in deciding what translation strategy should be 
adopted in China English contexts. 
Meanwhile, those China English expressions that are not transliterated 
or literally translated from Chinese but produced according to English 
grammatical rules may be created with deliberation and carry significant 
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cultural and political implications. One typical case is the translation 
guidelines involving the One China principle towards Taiwan. Specifically, 
in cross-strait context, China must be referred to as ‘the mainland’ as opposed 
to Taiwan regarded as an ‘island,’ thus making it clear that there is only one 
China (He, Li 2011, pp. 8-9; see also the discussion of Example 3 for more 
translation guidelines regarding the One China principle). The semantic 
nuances, which might seem trivial to people outside China, are actually 
viewed by China as a means to safeguard its national interest and image and 
to better achieve the goals of propaganda (e.g. Chen 2013). 
 
2.2. China English in China’s external propaganda practices 
 
As China English concurrently fits the official stress on ‘Chineseness’ of 
China’s foreign propaganda since 1980, it is heavily used in external 
propaganda under the political patronage of the Chinese government (Chen, 
Li 2013). Some Chinese researchers even suggest that the enhancement and 
widespread of Chinese culture through China English is not only the 
“subjective appeal” of Chinese people but also the “objective demand” and 
“inevitable trend” in inter-ethnic cultural exchange at the global level (Chen, 
Li 2013, p. 110). Yet, a few Chinese academics still hold negative views 
about the use of China English in external propaganda. Zhang and Meng 
(2007, pp. 135-6) maintain that some, if not many, political and cultural terms 
with Chinese characteristics are “mechanically” translated into English by 
following the original form of the Chinese source text, which may cause 
misunderstanding among non-Chinese people, and that Chinese translators 
should free themselves from the form of the source text and seek to get the 
original meaning across. To avoid confusing foreign audiences, Hong and 
Wang (2011, p. 124) consider that translators and interpreters must know the 
target audience of China’s publicity campaign and bear in mind the 
difference between Chinese and the Others. Some other academics adopt a 
moderate yet pro-CPC thinking, saying that while using Anglo-American 
English in Chinese official propaganda may appeal to Western audiences, 
safeguarding Chinese national interest and image remains the top priority, 
and that preserving Chinese characteristics and values in the propaganda 
translation can better achieve the propaganda goals (e.g. Chen 2013). 
While the formation of China English is regarded as a significant 
breakthrough in Chinese-English translation practice in that China English 
can help Chinese people better introduce everything with Chinese 
characteristics and meet the need of the Others to know China (Jin 2001, p. 
13), the main source of China English terms is the English texts released by 
China’s official media (Jin 2002, p. 72). Tang (2013) analyses the English 
versions of the reports on the work of the Chinese government, which are 
official annual reviews of the Chinese public sector’s results, and finds China 
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English heavily used to create English equivalents of words and phrases with 
Chinese characteristics, particularly in terms of China’s national policy, 
principles, and propaganda slogans. This indicates the ever-growing number 
of culture-loaded phrases, neologisms (for policies), and shortened form 
phrases in China English. Judging from the English documents released by 
Chinese official translation agencies and institutions, such as the Central 
Compilation & Translation Bureau (CCTB), Translators Association of China 
(TAC), China International Publishing Group (CIPG), and China Academy of 
Translation (CATL), as well as Chinese official media agencies, such as 
Xinhua News Agency and Beijing Review, China English remains the CPC’s 
linguistic instrument in promoting China and its ideology (e.g. Xu 2003; Bai, 
Cao 2018; Qiu 2018). 
Also noteworthy is that China English is conducive to unifying 
Chinese social ideology and maintaining China’s territorial integrity (Jin 
2001, p. 14), which is why the English texts released by Chinese authorities 
also target the general public in China in the name of promoting English 
learning and translation (Hung 2002, p. 331). In Jiang and Xu’s study that 
reveals China’s ideological and political education curriculum since the mid-
twentieth century and the present paradoxes of civic and political education 
in China's higher education institutions (2014), Chinese university students 
are nowadays said to be mostly resistant or reluctant to learn in ideological 
and political classes. This might mislead outsiders to expect poorer results of 
the Chinese government’s ideological and political indoctrination in the 
twenty-first century. In fact, nowadays Chinese people may unknowingly 
develop and reinforce their identity towards the CPC and the CPC’s policy by 
learning the China English slogans and texts released by Chinese authorities 
since China English terms and sentences included in such English texts have 
been widely made the materials for English language teaching and 
examinations at each level (e.g. Mu 2018) and for the China Accreditation 
Test for Translators and Interpreters (CATTI) (e.g. CIPG Training Center 
2019). 
 
 
3. China English translations in the official English 
version of Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th CPC National 
Congress 
 
Although many Chinese researchers attribute the success of the English 
version of Xi’s report to the 19th CPC National Congress to the involvement 
of the foreign English language expert (e.g. Huang 2018), according to some 
Chinese translators and officials who participated in the translation in 
question, the translation team was mainly composed of Chinese translators 
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recruited from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Liaison 
Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, Xinhua News Agency, the 
China International Publishing Group (CIPG), China Radio International 
(CRI) and some universities noted for foreign language and media 
communication expertise (Li T. 2018, p. 9). Also, CPC document translators 
must be linguistically competent and politically sensitive enough to increase 
international expressions of China’s intentions, facilitate the international 
communication of China’s political discourse, and use political expressions 
with Chinese characteristics that are unique to China instead of catering to 
foreign readers (Jia 2015, p. 93; Li T. 2018, p. 14). As pointed out by one 
Chinese translator and reviewer from China’s Central Compilation & 
Translation Bureau, the chief organisation in charge of the translation of the 
19th CPC National Congress documents, the foreign language experts were 
invited only to “polish” the translations of Xi’s report, and their involvement 
was considered to achieve good results in terms of “polishing the translations, 
improving the translations of the important concepts, and increasing the 
influence on the translation target readers” (Li T. 2018, p. 10). It is further 
specified that having these foreign language experts give interviews to 
Chinese and foreign press media not only facilitated “the international 
communication of the spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress” but also 
helped “tell China’s stories in a vivid way and spread China’s philosophy” 
(Li T. 2018, p. 10). Such insider information about the role of the foreign 
language experts is contradictory to what has been displayed in the video 
clips and news reports on these foreign language experts, in which these 
experts were indicated to be the chief translators of the report (see also the 
following section). Some Chinese academics even speak highly of the foreign 
language experts, for they have “provided standard and authentic foreign 
language versions of the 19th CPC National Congress report” (Li N. 2018, p. 
44). Yet, a cross-referencing of the official English version of Xi’s report and 
a book entitled Keywords to Understand China (Vol. 1), which, published in 
2016, was the result of joint efforts of China International Publishing Group 
and China Academy of Translation under the patronage of the Chinese 
government, shows that 28 out of the 90 keywords collected in the book were 
used without changes or with very slight changes in the official English 
version of Xi’s report (CIPG, CATL 2016). These keywords are culture-
loaded phrases or sentences, such as “It takes good blacksmith to make good 
steel” (CIPG, CATL 2016, pp. 46-7), or neologisms for policies, such as 
“1992 Consensus” (CIPG, CATL 2016, pp. 102-3). This is not unusual in 
China as when it comes to political expressions produced by previous CPC 
leaders or on previous occasions, CPC document translators are urged to 
inherit the translation legacy (Li T. 2018, p. 14), which means that the way in 
which some political expressions were translated may mostly remain in later 
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translations. In the following are three other much-discussed China English 
translation examples found in the official English version of Xi’s report that 
may give us a clearer picture of the ideological nature and function of China 
English. 
 
• Example 1 
三严三实 (Xi 2017a, p. 7) 
(Literally: three strictness and three earnestness) 
the Three Stricts and Three Earnests (Xi 2017b, p. 6) 
 
According to footnote 2 in the English full text of Xi’s report (2017b, p. 6), 
the full meaning of the “Three Stricts and Three Earnests” is “to be strict with 
oneself in practicing self-cultivation, using power, and exercising self-
discipline; and to be earnest in one’s thinking, work, and behavior.” This 
political slogan was first proposed by Xi Jinping in 2014 and previously 
translated into the “Three Guidelines for Ethical Behavior and the Three 
Basic Rules of Conduct” (CIPG, CATL 2016, p. 48-51) or “the Three Stricts 
and Three Honests” (China.org.cn 2015). Clearly, in the official English 
version of Xi’s report, the term was literally translated by using China 
English. Some Chinese researchers maintain that it is tedious and 
discouraging readers from seeing the point of this political idea if its meaning 
is fully rendered into English, and that the refined China English term can 
better attract attention of readers, who later can understand the term by 
referring to an explanatory note (Fang 2019, p. 120). It is ungrammatical in 
English to use the adjectives in a plural form, which, however, is typical of 
China English usage. One previous similarly structured term “Three 
Represents” (the title of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s political 
theory) was hailed as a “reasonable innovation” by the Chinese translators of 
the CPC documents and said to have been accepted by the international 
community (Xu 2003, p. 2). 
 
• Example 2 
照镜子、正衣冠、洗洗澡、治治病 (Xi 2017a, p. 7) 
(Literally: looking in the mirror, straightening clothes and hats, taking a 
bath, and treating illnesses) 
…examining ourselves in the mirror, tidying our attire, taking a bath, and 
treating our ailments (Xi 2017b, p. 6) 
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The parallel-structured metaphorical terms were first proposed by Xi Jinping 
in 2013 as the code of conduct for the CPC members, demanding them to 
follow the CPC constitution and requirements, to meet people’s expectations, 
to reflect on and correct one’s own misconduct, and to help cleanse the CPC 
of misconduct and corruption (Xu, Zhou 2013). Since then, the terms have 
been literally translated into “Watch from the mirror, groom oneself, take a 
bath and seek remedies” (China Daily 2013) or something similar. Some 
Chinese researchers maintain that these China English terms, produced 
through literal translation, are considered to “retain the form, content, and 
figure of speech of the Chinese language”, which helps communicate the 
Chinese culture to the world and allows foreigners to “have a deep 
understanding of the guidelines and policies that are with Chinese 
characteristics” (Jiang, Gong 2019, p. 60). However, intriguingly, in some 
online articles that highlight must-learn English expressions from the 19th 
CPC National Congress report, this example is found to be translated into 
“look into the mirror, straighten the attire, take a bath and seek remedies” 
(China Daily 2017), which is different from that in the official English 
version of the report. Another more intriguing phenomenon is that some 
English expressions that are regarded as excellent translations by Chinese 
researchers are not from the report in question but were produced beforehand, 
such as “双一流double first-class initiative” (e.g. Ye, Zhang 2018, p. 33). 
Here it seems that spreading the ideology matters more than learning English 
or studying translation, which echoes my discussion about the ideological 
nature and function of China English in the previous sections. 
 
• Example 3 
解决台湾问题、实现祖国完全统一，是全体中华儿女共同愿望…必须
继续坚持 “和平统一、一国两制” 方针… 承认 “九二共识” 
的历史事实，认同两岸同属一个中国，两岸双方就能开展对话，协
商解决两岸同胞关心的问题，台湾任何政党和团体同大陆交往也不
会存在障碍。(Xi 2017a, p. 55; my underlined emphasis) 
(Literally: Solving the Taiwan issue/question and realising the 
motherland’s complete unification is the shared wish of all Chinese 
people... [We] must continue to insist on the policy of ‘peaceful 
unification, one country two systems,’ … Recognising the historical fact 
of the ‘1992 Consensus,’ recognising the two sides across the [Taiwan] 
Strait belong to one China, and then both sides across the [Taiwan] Strait 
can enter into dialogue and negotiate over solving the problems that 
concern the people of both sides. There will be no obstacles to the 
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exchanges between any political party or group of Taiwan and [China’s] 
mainland.) 
Resolving the Taiwan question to realize China’s complete reunification 
is the shared aspiration of all Chinese people… We must uphold the 
principles of “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems,” 
…Recognize the historical fact of the 1992 Consensus and that the two 
sides both belong to one China, and then our two sides can conduct 
dialogue to address through discussion the concerns of the people of both 
sides, and no political party or group in Taiwan will have any difficulty 
conducting exchanges with the mainland. (Xi 2017b, pp. 50-1; my 
underlined emphasis) 
 
As indicated by the terms underlined above, the translations involving the 
One China principle towards Taiwan are exactly following the guidelines for 
China’s translators. ‘台湾问题’ must be rendered into the ‘Taiwan question’ 
as the word ‘issue’ implies the controversy over the One China principle 
(Guo 2002, p. 60). Also, China seeks ‘reunification’ instead of ‘unification’ 
with Taiwan as China maintains that Taiwan has long been part of China and 
that Taiwan is now a renegade province of China (Hong and Wang 2011, p. 
123). The fact that the phrase ‘one country’ (a bigger unit) precedes ‘two 
systems’ (smaller units) goes against English grammatical rules, but this is 
meant to highlight ‘one country’ as the focus of the political term (Du 1997, 
p. 55). China must be referred to as ‘the mainland’ as opposed to Taiwan 
regarded as an ‘island’ in cross-strait context, thus reinforcing the subordinate 
status of Taiwan to China (He, Li 2011, pp. 8-9). Last but not least, as if all 
the China English terms regarding the One China principle shown in this 
example were not enough for China to assert its ‘right’ to Taiwan, the first 
person plural possessive pronoun ‘our’ was added to the term ‘two sides.’ As 
the One China principle towards Taiwan has been constantly stated and 
repeated by China’s leaders, Example 3 may be described as nothing but a 
translation formula, which further indicates that the foreign English language 
expert invited to join the English translation project of Xi’s report might play 
no part here at all. Then, why have the terms such as ‘one country, two 
systems,’ ‘reunification,’ and the ‘Taiwan question’ still been specified and 
discussed as model translations from the English version of Xi’s report in 
many journal or online articles (e.g. He 2018, p. 99)? Again, it is very likely 
that the policy and ideology of the Chinese government are being spread and 
reinforced through discussion of these ‘model’ translations. 
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4. The image of the foreign language experts involved in 
the translations of Xi’s report to the 19th CPC National 
Congress, with a focus on the British translator 
 
Following Xi Jinping’s oral report to the 19th CPC National Congress, on the 
same day, Xinhua News Agency, China’s largest and most influential state-
run press agency, released news coverage introducing nine foreign language 
experts who participated in the translation of Xi’s report to the 19th CPC 
National Congress. The coverage included a video clip, individual photos of 
the nine experts, and their views on Xi’s report (Huang, Liu, Hao 2017). A 
few more similar news reports on these foreign translators then appeared on 
some of China’s other official press outlets, such as China Central Television 
(CCTV), China Global Television Network (CGTN), and New China TV (the 
official YouTube Channel of Xinhua News Agency). To investigate how 
China’s state-run media built up the image of the foreign translators, a 
multimodal analysis is used to examine the video clips and the individual 
photos of foreign English language expert Holly Snape. This subject is 
chosen because the English version of Xi’s report is the most widely 
discussed and promoted in China, the British translator enjoyed more media 
coverage than her other foreign counterparts, and this chapter focuses on 
China English translations instead of the translations in other foreign 
languages. 
A multimodal analysis is a social semiotic approach that focuses on 
how visual signs are used in combination and discovers the covert or overt 
visual statements. A tool kit was first developed by Kress and van Leeuwen 
(2006) to break down and analyse visual compositions such as photographs, 
advertisements, schoolbooks and so on, thus arriving at the (re)construction 
of the meaning of the components, arrangements, and qualities of these visual 
signs and uncovering more subtle or complex implications. Kress and van 
Leeuwen (2006) point out that human communication is seldom achieved by 
a single mode of communication; instead, more than one mode of 
communication, such as visual signs, sound, and language, may be used 
simultaneously to put together a jigsaw puzzle of meanings. The units of 
multimodal analysis go beyond oral and written language and further include 
acoustic and visual signs, thus broadening the examination or detection of 
how the world is ideologically structured and likely achieving a well-rounded 
and educated inference about manipulated statements. 
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Figure 1 
A screengrab of the photo of British translator Holly Snape released by Xinhua News 
Agency (Huang, Liu, Hao 2017). 
 
As shown in Figure 1, Snape, also known as a represented participant in 
multimodal analysis, does not directly face or look at viewers (or interactive 
participants as opposed to represented participants) (Kress, van Leeuwen 
2006, p. 114). Instead, she is looking at one absent interviewer, which puts 
the interactive participants in a position of observation. This means no direct 
contact is established between the two kinds of participants (Kress, van 
Leeuwen 2006, p. 117), with the represented participant offered to the 
interactive participants as an “item of information” or a “specimen in a 
display case” (Kress, van Leeuwen 2006, p. 119). Meanwhile, the fact that 
the represented participant is smiling demands the interactive participants to 
establish an imaginary relation of social affinity or to “form a pseudo-social 
bond” with the former (Kress, van Leeuwen 2006, p. 118). As Snape is cut 
off at approximately the waist, the size of frame is the medium close shot 
with far personal distance (Kress, van Leeuwen 2006, pp. 124-125). 
Furthermore, Snape is presented from an oblique but horizontal angle, which 
indicates she is not part of the interactive participants’ world yet she is not 
powerful or threatening; the detachment simply makes her “a phenomenon to 
be observed” (Kress, van Leeuwen 2006, p. 138). In terms of Snape’s 
appearance, her blonde hair, white skin, and slim figure make her fit the 
stereotype of a beautiful female native speaker of English in Chinese society, 
and her side swept hairstyle reinforces her feminine, elegant image. The 
Chinese caption below the photo reads “This is English language expert 
Holly Snape giving an interview in Beijing (photographed 14 October). 
Photographed by Xinhua News Agency reporter Jin Liangkuai,” which only 
highlights the interviewee as an expert. Above the photo, Snape is quoted as 
saying “Even as a foreigner, I also can feel the determination behind the 
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report and the important thinking it contains,” which has nothing to do with 
her translation task but is very similar to what her other foreign counterparts 
are quoted as saying. For instance, the Spanish language expert Josep-Oriol 
Fortuny Carreras is quoted as saying “The report conveys very clear 
philosophy. This is a long-term planning. It shows both the CPC and Xi 
Jinping know very clearly what China needs and how the goals should be 
achieved.” In fact, the news article mainly shows that these foreign language 
experts are full of praise and admiration for Xi Jinping and his report (Huang, 
Liu, Hao 2017). 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
A screengrab of British translator Holly Snape being interviewed  
in the video clip on the nine foreign language experts released by Xinhua News Agency 
(Huang, Liu, Hao 2017). 
 
Figure 2 is a screengrab of Snape being interviewed in the video clip 
embedded in the same news report discussed above. She is depicted as an 
‘expert’ as the set-up for her is the ‘breast pocket shot,’ with her name, 
country of origin, and job title superimposed on the screen; here the distance 
between the represented participant and the interactive participants signifies 
“respect for an authority” on English translation (Kress, van Leeuwen 2006, 
p. 126). In this three-minute-twenty-second-long clip, Snape appears for only 
about six seconds, and she says in a low and soft voice, with her head 
nodding and hands moving, “People who understand China in Britain will 
kind of understand the report and its content. In a very tiny way, I’m doing 
my best to do that.” Her vivid and earnest looks should win trust and affinity 
from the interactive participants. Here in the clip she talks about her 
expectations of this translation task and does not mention anything about the 
translation process, while the other foreign experts express their recognition 
of the CPC and the report and even anticipate China’s success in making 
itself and the Chinese nation great in the near future. 
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Another video clip posted by New China TV, the official YouTube 
Channel of Xinhua News Agency, is entitled “Meet 1st foreign readers of 
China's Party Congress report” (New China TV 2017), with English subtitles, 
and the subtitles shown on the first two frames are “The 19th CPC National 
Congress report has been translated into 10 languages” and “This is what 8 
language experts had to say about it.” This time, Snape appears longer, for 
approximately 17 seconds. As indicated by the screengrab of the clip (see 
Figure 3), this video clip is likely to have been shot on the same day as the 
previous video clip as Snape’s appearance and attire remain the same. She 
says in the clip, “To me that says that China is really kind of trying hard to 
communicate with the rest of the world. I am really glad I can do some part to 
try to help that.” Apart from her recognition of China, her words here seem to 
be paraphrasing what she says in the previous video clip. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
A screengrab of British translator Holly Snape being interviewed  
in the video clip posted by New China TV (2017). 
 
Still another two-minute-thirty-two-second-long video clip about these 
foreign language experts released by China Global Television Network 
(CGTN) focuses mainly on Holly Snape, interlaced with a few voiceless 
frames of the other foreign language experts (CGTN 2017). As suggested by 
the title of the video clip shown in Figure 4, “Discovering Chinese culture 
through political translations and family life,” Snape first talks in Mandarin 
Chinese about her life experience as a foreign woman marrying into a 
Chinese family. This part lasts for about 30 seconds, followed by two other 
parts regarding her positive impression and opinion about Xi’s report and 
China’s future success. Then, the last part is about the translation difficulties 
she has encountered, which is to convey in English the rich language, strong 
ideas, tempo, rhythm and feelings of the report. In this video clip, she still 
does not look directly at the interactive participants, but she tilts more to the 
front and smiles or grins more often. This enables her to establish a relation 
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of more social affinity with the interactive participants but remain a detached 
language expert. Also, the first part about her family life in China reinforces 
her image as a China hand, which further enhances the credibility of her 
identification with and recognition of the CPC and the report. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
A screengrab of British translator Holly Snape being interviewed  
in the video clip posted by CGTN (2017). 
 
As shown by the multimodal analysis results, the focus of the media coverage 
of the foreign language experts has been more on the translators’ 
endorsement of Xi’s thoughts and achievements than on the translation 
quality or strategy (e.g. Huang, Liu, Hao 2017). 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Around a decade ago, China scholar David Shambaugh doubted whether the 
CPC could continue to control Chinese society through “a mish-mash of 
slogans that few understand or believe” (Shambaugh 2008, p. 58) and 
suggested that China’s external propaganda work, which “remains clumsy, 
rhetorical, propagandistic, and relatively unsophisticated,” should “hinder its 
soft power” (Shambaugh 2013, p. 268). Now, as indicated by the analysis 
results of this study, the CPC and the use of China English in its external 
propaganda have been progressing and keeping up with the time. The 
involvement of the foreign language experts in the translations of Xi 
Jinping’s report to the 19th CPC National Congress and the media coverage 
of these experts have made the foreign language versions of Xi’s report an 
unprecedented success as a political document. Better yet, what these foreign 
language experts have endorsed is not only the CPC’s policy and ideology 
but also the legitimacy and appropriateness of China English as a variety of 
English. Perhaps before long, the ideological implications behind the CPC’s 
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promotion of China English may go further towards what South Korean 
researcher Kyoo-Seob Lim has suggested in his study of the CPC’s ideology 
with Chinese characteristics: 
 
 
The Communist Party of China sinicises both ‘traditional culture’ and 
‘Western values’ so that, on the one hand, it can insist on demonstrating 
Chinese characteristics in its own way, while, on the other hand, it can actively 
participate in the development of globalisation and further deconstruct the 
West-centred globalisation. Through this process of sinicisation and 
participation in globalisation, the Communist Party of China is telling Chinese 
people: globalisation is not exclusive to the West and Chinese people are 
entitled to participate; globalisation is no longer the West’s globalisation and 
should be China’s globalisation. (2004, p. v; my translation) 
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